Politics Government Books

The lessons are easy to teach & understand utilizing a spiral learning format, so the lessons are taught then practiced over and over. It challenges students to go farther than other curriculums. It uses sentence diagraming at a higher level, but easy to teach and learn. It is so easy you could basically pull out the workbook lesson and the child can teach himself.

I used "First Language Lessons for the Well-Trained Mind" for grades 1 and 2 and was thrilled that Jessie Wise came out with a book for grade 3. I wasn't, however, thrilled that I now had to purchase a second "workbook", but I did it anyway and BOY! am I glad I did. This workbook makes grammar a breeze. It is well worth the money. Trying to duplicate everything on paper would be more headache than I am prepared to put up with (I homeschool more than one child and time is treasured). The text itself is very comprehensive and challenging. We are into our second week of school and I am loving this product. I highly recommend.

This is a very well written book and just as fun as the First Language Lessons for 1st and 2nd grade. We love it!

This book is a good foundational way of introducing all the grammar lessons. It's not too labor intensive, yet it repeats enough to achieve mastery.

I am a homeschooler and have tried several grammar books and programs before purchasing this one because this level did not exist when I originally started searching for a language program for my children I'd previously used level 1 & 2 of this program.

I purchased Easy Grammar Daily Guided Review grade two and the author of that great program said to use it for grammar warmups. The search was on and I discovered that this book exists. Volume 4 is in the stage of being created now.

I give it 5 stars because it is an exceptional language arts program, it teaches the 8 parts of speech, alphabetization up to the third letter in a word, dictionary skills, letter writing and many other important skills. For a comprehensive list and overview see [...]. If you go to [...] they have a 50 page student book and a 89 page instructor's manual so you can try before you buy.

For variety I sometimes use worksheets from softbasics software and find that I will have more than enough materials to last two or more years. When I combine that program with this book I know that I am giving my children a well rounded langauage arts program that I can be proud of for years to come.

In this book, the author presents his grand strategy for U.S. involvement in the Middle East. The bottom line is that the author considers the uninterrupted flow of oil from the Middle East as THE vital interest of the U.S. in that region of the world, and that all actions of the U.S. must revolve around protecting this vital interest.

Foremost in his argument is that in order to protect the flow of oil from the region, we must prevent upheavals such as civil wars, Salifist activities - to include terrorism within the region, and violent government overthrows that could ultimately spread to regional conflicts and disruption of oil flow from occurring. Further, he states that to achieve this end, we must help in the reform of the region's governments, educational systems, and economies, among other things, in order to reduce civil unrest and ultimately lead to a more stable region.

Overall, I thought his arguments and ideas were easily understood, well thought out, and supported with facts and data when necessary. Obviously, the amount of resources required to implement such a strategy would require greater thought and more detailed analysis (military forces and money required) based on the specific actions taken to implement this strategy - but as an overarching "doctrine" I think that the author presents an outstanding framework.

I was especially intrigued by the author's last chapter dealing with the future impact that China could play in the Middle East, and the potential difficulties and opportunities that this presents. I also thought that his arguments pointed to the urgency of becoming less dependent on foreign oil - which would provide the U.S. more "breathing space" and options when dealing with the governments of the region. Finally, his detailed ideas for specific actions for the U.S. to pursue with each country within the Middle East are excellent starting points for future discussion and plans.

Overall I think that this is a must read and I highly recommend.

Take the case of Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche: just about every college freshman has heard of him, most have an opinion of his work, a few have read (or attempted to read) his books and a very small number have an informed opinion, derived from careful study and consideration of his thoughts in context. Analogously to Nietzsche, most everyone, well at least political blog readers, media pundits and avid conspiracy theorists, have heard of Kenneth Michael Pollack. Also analogous to Nietzsche, most have an opinion, but, at least based on my impressions of the majority of internet postings, few have actually read and attempted to understand his thinking. Such is the case with Pollack's latest book, "A Path Out of the Desert: a Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East".

By way of introduction, Pollack, a former CIA Middle East Iran specialist, analyst and National Security Council member in the Clinton Administration, who is now Director of Middle East Research at Brookings, was launched into media attention with the publication of, "The Threatening Storm: the Case for Invading Iraq". That book presented detailed arguments which addressed the problems presented by the Saddam
Hussein regime. After careful consideration of the various alternatives, Pollack favored invading Iraq, as this option, which appeared to be the best of those available at the time when considering the level of evidence, presented the most expedient and reasonable method for dealing with the geostrategic problems posed by Saddam's government. Note that nearly one third of "Storm" detailed the likely consequences of military action and gave recommendations for managing the aftermath, namely, the efforts required to stabilize and rebuild the country after the war.

While the administration of George W. Bush chose the military option (an action some attributed to Pollack's highly influential book), it ignored his "grand strategy" for rebuilding the country. The debacle Pollack predicted resulted, along with the expected barrage of public outrage. As a result of Bush Administration actions, now unfairly associated with Pollack, he was promptly tarred with the "neoconservative" epithet by Bush detractors as well as a myriad of anti-war activists. Pollack's commentaries on CNN and elsewhere confirmed his position as an authority on the Iraq War, but simultaneously solidified the public perception of him as a "war supporter". Once that polarizing linkage was established, few troubled to read his subsequent work ("Persian Puzzle" and now, "Path"), but strident opinions on his books abound.

Worse for Pollack, his area of interest, the Middle East, is like the proverbial "tar baby": once touched, you're sort of stuck to it. Of course, the main attraction to the area from a strategic perspective is oil. Despite the fact that the greatest wealth transfer in history is now in progress (presently amounting to around $475 billion/year from oil consuming nations to oil producers) with all it's political and strategic implications, many people, including some influential policy makers, focus on the region for emotional reasons derived from religion. It is indeed an unfortunate fact that the majority of the world's petroleum resources are located in this area and that it is the nexus of 3 major religions, as this incendiary and toxic combination is causing apparently endless troubles.

With that preamble, it is hardly surprising that Pollack's newest book, "A Path Out of the Desert", has generated divisive internet traffic. A highly critical and largely uninformed review of the book was published in "The New York Times" by a commentator for "The Economist" (Max Rodenbeck) on August 22 of this year. Numerous blogs have quoted approvingly of Rodenbeck's commentary but many have done so without evident knowledge of the book itself. This is especially true of the more ideologically oriented blog writers. While this is not surprising, it is unfortunate, as Pollack clearly intended this book for the general reader, many of whom will not now take the time or effort to read the book.

"Path" is written in a highly colloquial manner. The majority of the book consists of a clear and logical synopsis of the problems facing the Muslim countries. Pollack summarizes a vast amount of data, most all of it dismal: burgeoning populations, lack of foreign investment (outside petroleum), bad educational systems, despotic governments, rising frustration from lack of opportunities, under- and unemployment...the list goes on. The causes for the hatred garnered by foreign states that have trodden upon the Middle East (US, Britain) are explained and responsibilities acknowledged and assigned. None of the information Pollack summarizes is controversial: it is all open-source and, in many cases, was published by Arabic analysts, the UN and other international organizations. Lacking an understanding of the problems of the region and their context makes informed perspectives impossible; yet, that appears to be the unfortunate state of affairs for many media and blog critics.

Note that the previous paragraph mentions specifically "Muslim" Middle Eastern problems. By virtue of his tangential association with the present Bush Administration, Pollack has been labeled as an unfettered supporter of Israel by some critics. For this reason, his concentration on the Muslim Middle East might be viewed as prejudicial by some readers. Pollack concentrates on those countries, rather than on Israel as "the problem", as Muslim nations mostly comprise that region and, more particularly, because they have what we want: that, naturally, is oil. That commodity (and maybe a dose of religion) is the source of our involvement and it is this involvement that Pollack argues is the origin of the resentment that is directed against the US.

However, this book is not arguing a particular political position. The point of Pollack's careful exposition of the vast array of problems which invest the region, almost none of which involve Israel, is that foreign interest in the region will persist, tensions will increase and an overall solution will required if the world wants access to oil and economic stability. Despite this, Pollack is careful to acknowledge that US support for that country aggravates our problems in the region, but these problems would exist for us even if Israel did not exist. Pollack further notes that our reasons for supporting Israel do not devolve from an insidious "neo-conservative", manipulative cabal, nor are they derived from Zionist machinations. Rather, they stem from the general American strategy of supporting democratic ideals, worldwide and from US strategic interests. American religious traditions (see, for example, Walter Russell Mead's recent "Foreign Affairs" article onthis subject) also figure prominently into our support for Israel. While this last is an important consideration, US support for democracy and support for a stable international order are the crucial issues here. Thus, political reform is the crux of the "grand strategy" Pollack describes later in the text.

Of course, any book which deals with the modern Middle East must address the issue of terrorism, an issue that directly and indirectly involves Islam or Islamism. Pollack makes the case that terrorism is a problem, but it is not the primary problem the US faces in the Middle East. Our interest is oil and our presence is the problem. Until and unless the reliance on petroleum vanishes, the US and (increasingly) other countries will have vital and competitive interests in accessing and protecting this resource and will incur problems as a result.

Pollack attributes the xenophobia encountered in the area to the constellation of social problems endemic in the Middle East: religion certainly plays a role, but, he
contends, it is neither the necessary nor the sufficient determinant of the specific problem of terrorism nor of the general resentment toward the West experienced there. The only way to massage the matter to our benefit is to devise a "grand strategy" for dealing with the plethora of problems infecting the Middle East.

Note that Pollack does not place blame for terrorism on Islam. Islam clearly does have an important role, both directly and indirectly, as it provides the ideological framework and justification for many if not most of currently active terrorist factions of interest to us. However, it does not constitute an ideological or theological straightjacket. Within the Arab world there are widely divergent interpretations of Islam, which in turn correspond to very different patterns of behavior. Anthropologists continue to argue about whether the individual's interpretation of the religion shapes the behavior of the individual, or the individual's desired pattern of behavior shapes his interpretation of religion. Clifford Geertz, in his monumental work "Islam Observed" makes a compelling case that religion (in this case,Islam) is modified by communities to suit their culture much more than the introduction of the religion reshapes the culture.

Regardless of the role of religion and it's interplay with Arabic culture, Pollack favors an "operant" approach derived from B.F. Skinner, to wit, positively reinforce the desired "behavior", negatively reinforce those you don't like and you will correct the underlying "problem". It can, and has, also been argued that large populations of young, under- and unemployed men can (and do) foment political and social disorder, so conflicts between religious and ethnic groups can often be traced to more mundane and malleable factors. Pollack suggests this is the case in the Middle East; hence, the "grand strategy" he favors deals primarily with this aspect, rather than dealing with the possible theological and cultural roots of the problem. This is pragmatic, as we can have little influence in the "spiritual" arena, anyway.

At a deductive level, there is nothing about the Quran or the Hadiths that make them especially crippling to economic development or governance in the same way that the Torah, the Gospels, or any other work of religion doesn't necessarily fetter Judaism or Christianity. The problem with scripture is how you interpret it. For instance, the Old Testament sanctions both slavery and polygamy, but neither has persisted in Israeli society (or the many "Christian" countries of Europe and the Americas). Additionally, Muslim countries in Africa do not necessarily demonstrate more problems with development than their Christian and Animist counterparts. Muslim countries in South and Southeast Asia (particularly Indonesia and Malaysia) are doing far better than the Arab states. Muslim communities do not have any problem adapting to (and profiting from) highly developed societies in the United States, India, and elsewhere. These observations suggest that, with the proper support, the Arabic Middle East might also evolve in a fashion congenial to US interests.

Given the constantly changing, but ever vexing, nature of the Middle East, it is difficult or impossible to make highly specific prescriptions or proscriptions for dealing with them. As a result, many of the recommendations made in this book come across as bromides. However, a complex, long-term policy simply cannot be described in detail at its outset. Such a policy evolves over time through a process of cogitation, consultation, discussion, debate, realization and a great deal of trial-and-error as Pollack repeatedly notes. Harkening back to the speech announcing the Marshall Plan itself--or Kennan's "Mr X" article, or Willy Brandt's various speeches, NSC-68, or any other of the foundational documents that helped establish the postwar Western strategy of reconstruction and containment in Europe--you will find them similarly skimpy on details. Even at his most insightful, Dean Acheson himself could not have foreseen the course of containment/reconstruction in Europe at its inception. What is important, and what all of these documents did, was to argue that the strategy was necessary and feasible, and define some concrete short-term steps to be taken.

With these qualifiers in mind, Pollack argues that the "grand strategy" the world (not only the US) must promote in the Middle East is to encourage reform: political, economic and social. Without some fundamental changes in governance, ones which encourage democratic participation (but not necessarily a parliamentary democracy), there is "no exit" from the morass besetting these countries. The case for this approach is carefully and repeatedly made in chapter after chapter. Patience, investment over decades (maybe longer) and occasionally acting through intermediaries will all be required. The maladroit interventions of the G.W. Bush Administration are raised as cautionary standards (the insistence on elections, quite premature, in the Palestinian Authority being a case-in-point).

While all this seems logical and compelling and ultimately necessary, rather than optional, there is one critical flaw in the reasoning: the American political system and the domestic constituency. The time horizon for successful transformation will be measured in decades or generations, rather than weeks or months. US public opinion has, at
least since the post-WWII Marshall Plan in Europe and the reconstruction of Japan, never tolerated a commitment of this sort (excepting Korea, the "forgotten war" and forgotten obligation). Worse, the lack of American political leadership, one bedeviled by
"focus groups", public opinion surveys and the need for votes, all militate against any sort of long-term measures of the type Pollack advocates. When called upon to sacrifice, the American public is nowhere to be found, even when the investment in time and resources
can be manifestly shown to be in our interest. Rather, the general voter, whether it's the Middle East or global warming wants "something" to be done...but not by me if there is any cost involved. This perhaps feckless tendency, not necessarily unique to the US, is
the crux of the problem.

Paradoxically, the "light on the horizon" in this case is oil, itself. While the time line has been disputed, it seems likely that, at current levels of consumption and considering known and likely reserves, technology, etc, oil will become economically unfeasible to recover in about 40 years. The cost of oil is already having baleful effects on the world economy. Burning fossil fuels is also having dire environmental consequences. Competition for this resource is increasing. Because of these factors, there is some prospect for adoption of the approach Pollack advocates, but it will likely require concerted effort by multiple governments, probably under the aegis of the UN. Once reliance on petroleum products becomes a lesser issue, great power involvement in the Middle East is likely to decrease in scale and the irritation provoked by US presence, at least, is therefore likely to recede.

In summary, this is an excellent and important book. It cogently presents a plan for dealing with the Middle Eastern "tar baby" and, just as importantly, it provides the necessary background materials for understanding the region, it's problems and the need for addressing them. Like "The New York Times", I thought it was notable
work, one of the most important published this year.

The Middle East will continue to dominate American security concerns regardless of who next occupies the Oval Office. Record oil prices, terrorism, Israel's security, Iraqi stability, and Iran's nuclear ambitions will top the new president's foreign policy agenda, whatever his ideological outlook. With A Path Out of the Desert (Random House, 592 pages, $30), Ken Pollack, a former CIA analyst and Clinton-era National Security Council staffer, has penned a thoughtful rejoinder to those who, frustrated by President Bush's failures, might throw up their hands in frustration and walk away from the region.

Mr. Pollack is a good writer and his narrative is clear. He begins by outlining America's interests in the Middle East, dedicating separate chapters to oil, Israel, America's Arab allies, and nonproliferation. His acknowledgment of Israel's safety and security as a fundamental American interest is refreshing, given statements made by his colleagues at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, where Mr. Pollack is director of research, and given an increasingly large bloc within the Democratic Party that now argues the opposite. He does not include terrorism, political Islam, and instability in countries such as Iraq as American interests per se, but rather as threats that emanate from other problems, a semantic construction that allows Mr. Pollack to argue that American policy should better address the root causes of the Middle East's troubles.

These he outlines in chapters examining socioeconomic problems and the crisis in Middle East politics. Mr. Pollack's omission of the treatment of women as a major social issue may surprise half the region's population, but his emphasis on the Middle East's "crippling educational method" is long overdue, as anyone who has ever sat through a university class in Egypt, Iraq, or Iran can attest. To his credit, Mr. Pollack condemns the tendency to mix education and politics--unfortunately an import now plaguing Middle Eastern studies in America--but the issue is worth more than the two pages he gives it here. A discussion of press incitement to violence, unfortunately missing in Mr. Pollack's analysis of the region, would also have been worthwhile. Arab broadcasting of hatred and agitation to murder has undermined peace efforts under both Presidents Clinton and Bush, yet too many diplomats happily ignore it.

In his policy proposals, Mr. Pollack bends similarly to the political winds; the position he stakes out in A Path Out of the Desert reflects a tendency to allow the mistakes of the Bush administration to crowd out the experience of his predecessors. This is especially apparent in his discussion of the root causes of terror and instability: He underplays the importance of Islamist ideology as a cause, in favor of an overemphasis on political and economic factors.

Mr. Pollack argues that political Islam "is not necessarily a threat to the United States," though he acknowledges that "neither is it unrelated to the threats we face from the Muslim Middle East." Later, he declares that "Islam is not the reason for the rise of Islamist movements, nor is it the cause of the terrorist threat that the United States faces." True, many Muslims may not accept the radical scriptural interpretations offered by fundamentalists, but it is wrong to argue that religious motivation, no matter how twisted the exegesis, isn't a chief motivating concern of Islamists.

In his effort to understand Islamism, Mr. Pollack has drawn on the work of a Sarah Lawrence College professor, Fawaz Gerges, whose work, if not quite apologetic for political Islam, is nevertheless superficial. Economic, political, and social grievance is only half the Islamist story: After all, most suicide bombers are not poor and dispossessed, but middle-class and educated. Perhaps Mr. Pollack is correct that suicide terrorists are not sociopaths, but what did mold them psychologically? Anger and despair are not explanation enough: Sub-Saharan Africa does not breed global suicide bombers like the Arab world. Nor do radical interpretations rise from grass roots; often Saudi funding for radical mosques plays an essential role.

Mr. Pollack is also too trusting of adversaries. He believes the former Iranian president, Mohammad Khatami, was sincere in his Dialogue of Civilizations, but the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate exposed the program as a cover for an accelerating covert nuclear weapons program.

With 20/20 hindsight, Mr. Pollack takes issue not with the Bush policy of pre-emption, but rather with the assessment of threats that brought about the war in Iraq. Nor does he oppose transformative diplomacy, just the incompetent way in which it was undertaken. He parts ways with liberals who ironically insist that democracy cannot take root in the Middle East's infertile ground. Former fellow travelers will be disappointed in his argument that economic liberalization--including, presumably, foreign direct investment--must come to the Arab world's socialized economies.

When he looks forward, Mr. Pollack's prescription--legal and educational reforms--should provoke little argument, and he is correct that the next administration must repackage its approach because of the stigma left behind by the Bush administration's whiplash reversals and poor policy implementation.

In an effort to rehabilitate the reputation of democracy promotion, Mr. Pollack traces its history to Clinton hands such as Madeleine Albright, Richard Holbrooke, and Dennis Ross, and "reasonable and moderate" Bush administration officials such as Richard Haass. This is hogwash. Bush administration implementation was both sloppy and spastic, but little in the historical record suggests the Clinton administration grasped transformative diplomacy as anything more than window dressing for their belief that autocracy equals stability.

Ultimately, there is very little new in the "grand strategy" Mr. Pollack suggests should replace the failed policies of the past. Indeed, while he describes himself as a liberal internationalist, A Path out of the Desert is little more than a neoconservative manifesto uncorrupted by the bluntness of Richard Perle or the arrogance of Douglas Feith.

His strategy consists, essentially, of implementing the George W. Bush doctrine as it was articulated during his first term: actively aiding reform in the region on the principle that short-term stability and long-term security are very different things.

Mr. Pollack might have contributed more had he also addressed how to reform the bloated and ineffective State Department and international organization bureaucracy, which impeded the implementation the first time around. Foggy Bottom is inept at international development, and the World Bank spends far more on its own administration than it does on micro-loans. Some proposals beg more realism. Creating regional security architecture sounds great in principle, but expecting Arab dictators to abandon their antipathy of Israel in order to solve regional problems is tilting at windmills. It is hard to judge, from this vantage, the merits of the Bush doctrine, since it was never implemented properly or competently, but as a vision of change in the Middle East it remains a compelling project. If Mr. Pollack's grand strategy gives the Bush doctrine a second wind, both the Middle East and long-term American national security will be better for it.

Michael Rubin
New York Sun
July 22, 2008

The formulation of any strategy is dependent on knowing the goals which the strategy is to achieve. In this excellent book, Pollack identifies two goals that he sees as the purpose of his so-called Grand Strategy for the Middle East. The first goal is to ensure the flow of oil from the Middle Eastern and to protect its petroleum reserves. The second goal is to ensure the national security of the State of Israel. The first goal is based on the fact that the U.S. (and world) economy currently is dependent on petroleum. The second goal is based on the fact that the very value system of the U.S. demands that the nation support the Israeli State. Of the two the second is the most important since it is directly related to what the U.S. means as a nation-state.

Pollock then identifies how he believes the U.S. can achieve these goals. In his thinking, if peace, prosperity and the rule of law can be implanted among the Islamic states of the Middle East some form of democracy and regional stability will follow. Ironically peace, prosperity, and rule of law are also what the Islamic fundamentalist (including the Salafi extremists) wish to achieve although they appear to wish a theocracy rather than a democracy. Also Pollock understands prosperity to be a direct function of a free market economy and a secular, but functioning legal system. He therefore advocates a sensible implementation of a long term strategy involving diplomatic, economic and social operations designed to move the Middle East in this direction. And he realistically sees this implementation as running over years if not decades.

He addresses the issue of terrorism with equal good sense. He implies, but does not state that the U.S. will never be entirely safe from terrorist attacks simply because of the nature of terrorism as a function of the disaffected. But he maintains that Islamic forms of terrorism are less probable in a prosperous and just society. In the same manner a prosperous and just Middle East will not solve the problems of Israel and the Palestinian question, but it may make them easier to resolve for all concerned.

Now this all should sound pretty familiar since this is more or less the strategy that the George W. Bush administration espoused as the main reason for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Pollock supported this action, (see The Threatening Storm, 2002), but believes that the Bush administration so mismanaged post-war Iraq and demonstrated such monumental incompetence as to give this strategy a permanent black eye. Pollock sees this as a tragic consequence and argues that with intelligent and thoughtful implementation this strategy is truly the way to bring the Middle East as a whole into the fellowship of prosperous and just societies. He may be right.

Here is The Economist's Review of Path Out of the Desert.

The Economist
Books and Arts
America and the Middle East
How they got in, how to get out
Jul 24th 2008
From The Economist print edition

Foresight and hindsight in the world's bad places
A Path Out of the Desert: A Grand Strategy for America in the Middle East
By Kenneth M. Pollack
Random House; 539 pages; $30

A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East
By Lawrence Freedman
PublicAffairs; 624 pages; $29.95. Weidenfeld & Nicolson; £20

HOW did America get into its current mess in the Middle East? And how can it get out again? Kenneth Pollack's book is all about the second question but he starts by making a confession relevant to the first. He was a champion of the invasion of Iraq. In 2002, in an influential book entitled "The Threatening Storm", he argued the strategic and moral case for removing Saddam Hussein. Mr Pollack admits now that the intervention a year later was a fiasco, and that after such a disaster the inclination of most Americans is to turn away from the region completely and focus on problems at home. But that is not his view. His latest book is a powerful argument for continued, and perhaps even greater, American involvement in the Middle East.

As befits a former CIA analyst and member of the National Security Council, Mr Pollack builds his case on a hard-headed examination of America's interests in the region. Of these, the most important is oil. If a big percentage of it were suddenly to be removed from the market, the shock of higher prices could on some estimates spark a global recession akin to the Great Depression. American policy, he concludes, should therefore be designed principally to prevent "catastrophic oil disruptions". This means guarding against possibilities such as a revolution in Saudi Arabia or a massive terrorist attack on the oil-supply network.

You might expect a book that starts this way to dwell mainly on how America can maintain military forces in the region. Mr Pollack, however, wants nothing less than "an integrated grand strategy" to secure American interests for the long run. Such a strategy, he admits, may take "many decades", just as it took nearly half a century for America to help Europe and East Asia repair themselves after the second world war. For this grand strategy to work, he says, America will first have to harmonise its separate policies towards Iraq, Iran and Israel. It must also transform the region's politics and economics. That is to say--let no one accuse the chastened Mr Pollack of imperial hubris--America must help along the efforts of the locals, since outsiders "cannot possibly know how to change the society of another people".

But do the people of the Middle East want what America wants for them? Given the growth of political Islam, and the fact that Mr Pollack deems many Arab countries to be on the point of revolution, perhaps not. Nonetheless, a policy of continuing to prop up repressive regimes is like "playing Russian roulette" with foreign policy, as America discovered when the shah's fall turned Iran from staunch friend to implacable foe. Far better, he says, to encourage the region's governments to address popular grievances by embracing political freedom and social equality.

This will not be easy, not least because of the hated Bush administration's insincere or at least incompetent pursuit of this very policy. But Arabs tell pollsters that they want both democracy and Islam, and Mr Pollack reckons these two are compatible. Quoting an Egyptian activist who says that what her countrymen need is a job and a voice, he thinks America must find its path out of the desert by helping all Arabs get both.

A simple summary of Mr Pollack's main ideas does scant justice to this thoughtful and informative book. None of its prescriptions is especially novel. The patient promotion of reform, careful containment of the spillover from Iraq, a policy of carrots and sticks (but no military pre-emption) for Iran, building the sinews of a Palestinian state: to all except isolationists and the few surviving neocons, this has become a fairly conventional prospectus for America's post-Iraq policy in the Middle East. But Mr Pollack binds the strands together deftly and imparts a good deal of learning and wisdom along the way.

Sir Lawrence Freedman is less interested in how America should proceed after Iraq and more in working out how it tied itself in such knots in the first place. As an historian, he is more tolerant than Mr Pollack of George Bush, noting that after September 11th this president faced a challenge more complex in some ways than the one Franklin Roosevelt had to deal with after Pearl Harbour in 1941. Whereas Roosevelt knew who the enemy was and what America would have to do, Mr Bush had to choose and name an enemy in a new sort of war without obvious rules, aims or front-lines. He did so, moreover, in a region where no power had exercised a consistently sure touch, and where America had long been torn between an underlying dissatisfaction with the state of affairs and the traditional instinct of a great power to protect the status quo from aggressive states or radical movements.

It is instructive to read these books together. Sir Lawrence's aim is not to lay out a policy. He has no grand unifying theory of the Middle East. His aim is only to render the "most credible" account possible of momentous events such as the fall of the shah, the three wars in the Persian Gulf, invasion and jihad in Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter's half-success at peacemaking at Camp David in 1978 and Bill Clinton's failure there two decades later. All these and more formed the treacherous backdrop of American interests and alliances against which Mr Bush had to formulate his response to the attacks on the twin towers. Sir Lawrence's subtle narrative is a marvel of concision, even over more than 500 pages. By the end it cannot but make the reader wonder how realistic it is to advocate, as Mr Pollack does, an "integrated grand strategy" capable of being sustained for decades in such a violent and unpredictable part of the world.

To that Mr Pollack has a simple answer, in the form of a question. What is the alternative? Thanks to its energy needs, America is locked into the region for the foreseeable future, even though the future is so hard to foresee in the unhappy Middle East. Since there are no quick fixes, it had better reconcile itself to the long slog. And although unexpected events will continue to knock it off course, it is more likely to succeed if it can cling to at least some general sense of where it is trying to go.

This book is an excellent read for those political junkies who are following this election day by day.

Drew Westen draws on both basic neuropsych research and political research. He is not always clear which of the two he is using in his conclusions. This is a well written book by a committed Democrat. His analysis of why people vote for particular candidates is interesting and believable. Yep, this is why they made Socrates drink the hemlock. A must read for all who hope to vote in an informed way or who intend to run for office.

As a psychotherapist and author, I'm amazed at how Westen makes such a complex, well researched subject so compelling and fascinating. I am rarely a nonfiction reader out of my genre of psychology, but this book is a pleasure to read. Westen explains how the parts of the brain work together and helps us easily understand the role of emotion in deciding not just the fate of the nation but everything political. I have recommended this book to all my friends.

The Republican Party, to its credit, has exploited this fundamental principle of politics for decades, while many Democratic candidates have retreated into a "safe" strategy of not offending the electorate.

This has lead to an extremely unhealthy state of one-party dominance at many levels of government.

Westen utilizes brain science and research to prove that taking a clear stance on a controversial issue, even if it is the "wrong" stance in the view of the pollsters, will garner more votes that hiding behind a staid shield of non-offensive double-talk.

"The Political Brain" by Drew Westen is an important contribution to the political science literature in general and an inspiration for Democratic Party supporters in particular. Mr. Westen's knowledge of psychology and the cognitive sciences provides insight into how the individual develops a political consciousness. Showing how the Republican Party has gained advantage by developing an emotionally fear-laden narrative designed to exploit the electorate's psychic sensibilities, Mr. Westen argues that Democrats can and must develop a compelling counternarrative that appeals to the American public's better angels in order to inspire their supporters and win consistently at the polls.

The first section discusses the mind, brain and emotion in politics. Mr. Westen draws upon the latest scientific research to explain how emotion is integral to the brain's cognitive function. Mr. Westen recites passages delivered by Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Bill Clinton to illustrate how political messages are most effective when they tie issues to emotionally resonant themes and images. Importantly, Mr. Westen also deconstructs the neoliberal ideology of Ronald Reagan to help us better understand the importance of evolutionary psychology and crafting popular messages with curb appeal.

The second section provides a blueprint for executing emotionally compelling campaigns. Mr. Westen explores the multiple layers of voter intelligence to reveal how Republicans have successfully used subliminal messaging to activate the public's feelings of anxiety in order to get people to vote against their own material self-interests. The author stresses that when Democratics shy away from conflict, voters instinctively detect weakness; therefore he recommends that Democrats cede nothing and go after issues that many voters tend to perceive as Republican. To that end, Mr. Westen offers a series of principled narratives on contentious issues such as abortion, affirmative action, gay rights and gun control that he believes could easily help the Democrats gain majority support by activating the American voter's sense of fairness, freedom and equality of opportunity. While perhaps not fully convincing on all subjects, Mr. Westen amply demonstrates that a coherent and inspirational counternarrative is possible.

Unfortunately, this otherwise excellent book succumbs to a transparent attempt at self-promotion by forcing readers to go to the author's website to read the footnotes. Boo! Yet despite this minor deficiency, I highly recommend this timely and fascinating book to everyone.

This book it a need of anyone who is either interested in or studies political science. I am an International Relations major at Harvard, and I have used the book in every government course I have had. It is very easy to read and not over-articulate. I like Lijphart's clear analysis, it is a great book.

Arendt Lijphart's book Patterns of Democracy is an interesting book in that it says something strong with a weak support. The primary goal of Lijphart is to compare the consensus model of democracy with the majoritarian one, and by doing so prove the superiority of the former to the latter in terms of democratic ideals and government performance. Yet the arguments he puts forward lack both theoretical consistency and empirical support, not to mention their irrelevance as a policy-recommendation to most of the developing world, of which main problem is "to govern" rather than "how to govern". I think, as a student from a developing country, I have enough background and reason to oppose the arguments and findings (?) of Lijphart.

Lijphart does a nice job in bringing together the salient distinguishing characteristics of majoritarian and proportional democracies. He first divides these characteristics into two main groups as executive-parties dimension and federal-unitary dimension; then, he demonstrates that majoritarian and consensus democracies differ remarkably on each dimension. So far this section -which comprises the bulk of the book- is concerned, patterns of democracy is an invaluable resource for its breadth, clarity, and strength.

Yet the problems surface when Lijphart starts answering the "so what?" question. Above all, Lijphart is biased toward the ideal of democracy which maintains that every person must have a say in any decision that influences his/her life. Actually, no one has any problem with this ideal. But Lijphart's conclusion that because consensus democracies fare better in accomplishing this ideal they are superior to the majoritarian models of democracy is misleading and inconsistent with the premise of representational democracy. It is misleading simply because Lijphart criterion for judging between the two models of democracy is only one of the criteria that is to be used, it is neither the most important nor the determining one. Democratic governments are formed to "govern" and "represent". Yet Lijphart's arguments are predominantly based on the "representation" criterion. There is trade-off between efficient/durable governments and proportional/representational ones. As Powell (2000) shows in his Elections as Instruments of Democracy, and Lijphart acknowledges this fact, majoritarian governments fare better in terms of efficiency and durability, hence "governability". Lijphart's own research reveals that majoritarian governments perform better in terms of economic growth (p. 266); and all his "bivariate" findings supporting the purported positive relationship between consensus democracy and economic performance evaporates when he includes control variable. It is inconsistent, because taken to the extreme, to satisfy the proportional representation criterion, every single party in every single district should send at least one candidate to the parliament, which would increase the size of the parliaments to tens, if not hundreds, of thousands. The mere "size of the body elected", which is in general less than a thousand because of the idea of representation, forces us to satisfy only the preferences of some voters. So, why blame a principle that we stick at lower level, and we believe that it works well at that level, when it comes to upper level? If we are only concerned about the democratic ideal, why do we not apply "direct democracy" then?

The salient superiority of majoritarian democracy (and the characteristics that are associated with it) over proportional democracy is that it gives way to strong, durable, and efficient government. True, efficiency and strength might translate into negative outcomes as well (such as the repression of minorities or the abolishing of some rights). But the appropriate to overcome this possible problem is not to get rid of majoritarian system (and the advantages it brings forward); rather, we should devise ways in which we can incorporate the elements of "direct" and "proportional" governments into our majoritarian democracies. Increasing decentralization and constitutional rigidity and introducing new instruments such as initiative and referendum have the potential to increase the performance of majoritarian governments with regard to achieving the democratic ideal without losing their existing advantages. To me, therefore, Lijphart is searching after a wrong question, which deals with "whether" consensus or majoritarian democracy. We are more likely to be better-off if we work to find synthetic ways of bringing together the differing characteristics of majoritarian and consensus governments. Thus, so far as the relationship between consensus and majoritarian democracies is concerned, the question is "how much", not whether.

Lijphart was indeed on the the most influential political scientists of his generation.

This book, however, is pure advocacy and a simple rehashing of previous work.

The quantitative analysis in this book is APPALLINGLY bad. I has become an exemplar in our department of misleading and inept use of basic statistics.

If you want to read something outstanding by Lijphart find one of his books on consociationalism.

Lijphart seeks to test which type of democratic institutions - consensus or majoritarian - performs most effectively. He tests the performance of these institutions through a statistical analysis of their relative efficiency in three broad fields: macroeconomic management, control of violence, and what he terms the "kinder and gentler" qualities of democracy (293). However, before discussing the results of Lijphart's study, it is necessary to explore what distinguishes the institutions of majoritarian and consensus systems.
Lijphart distinguishes between these two types of democracy by illustrating ten institutional differences which divide the typologies. For clarity, the author divides these ten differences into two distinct dimensions: executives-parties, and federal-unitary. The executives-parties dimension addresses "the arrangement of executive power, the party and electoral systems, and interest groups" (3). The federal-unitary dimension illustrates differences in institutional structure of a federated versus unitary government.
According to the executives-parties dimension, the majoritarian system, or Westminster model, is found to have a two party system and a strong one-party executive and cabinet. Often the executive is more powerful than his or her legislative counterparts. Furthermore, a majoritarian system often uses a single member district electoral system which can lead to disproportional representation, and has a highly competitive pluralist interest group system. Lijphart cites Britain and pre-1996 New Zealand as majoritarian systems.
Lijphart's consensus democracy varies institutionally from the Westminster model. First, under the majoritarian model, the executive office is often composed of a multi-party power-sharing cabinet or coalition. In addition, power-sharing exists between the executive branch and the legislature the electoral system often promotes proportional representation. Lastly, unlike the highly competitive special interest group system of the Westminster model, a consensus democracy promotes a system of interest group compromise (4). Lijphart uses Switzerland and Germany as examples of consensus democracy.
According to the federated-unitary dimension, the Westminster system has a strong, centralized government and a unicameral legislature. In addition, most majoritarian systems possess a very flexible constitution that can readily be amended or changed. Furthermore, in many majoritarian systems, the legislature holds the final word in the constitutionality of legislation, and as such, majoritarian systems do not have a strong system of judicial review.
The consensus model, on the other hand, often has a decentralized government, and can be a federated system. Often the legislature is divided into two houses. In addition, the constitution is often rigid, making change difficult. Lastly, the consensus system often has a strong institution of judicial review to monitor the legality of legislation.
To test the effectiveness of consensus and majoritarian systems, Lijphart compares the performance of the two democracies on three main categories: macroeconomic management, levels of political violence, and the "kinder, gentler" aspects of democracy. Lijphart's hypothesis "is that consensus democracy produces better results - but without the expectation that the differences will be very strong and significant" (261).
When exploring the effectiveness of the two democracies in macroeconomic management, the author operationalizes a number of variables. For the sake of brevity, I will condense the findings into six categories: economic growth, inflation rates, unemployment, strike activity, budget deficits, and freedom index. Lijphart tests the performance of the democracies by using both the executives-parties dimension and federated-unitary dimensions.
In the case of economic growth using the executives-parties dimension, there was little difference between majoritarian and consensus democracy. There was a weak negative relationship between consensus democracy and economic but the findings were not statistically significant. This implies that the difference between consensus and majoritarian democracies in regards to economic development is negligible. In regards to inflation, Lijphart finds that consensus democracies have a slightly lower rate of inflation than majoritarian systems. Consensus also performs slightly better than the majoritarian model in regards to unemployment, but again, the differences are slight.
Interestingly, Lijphart found a massive relationship between strike activity and consensus democracy. According to the regression coefficient, levels of strike activity would have been substantially lower in consensus systems than in majoritarian. However, upon further analysis the relationships are not statistically significant and as Lijphart illustrates, the large difference is a result of "big exceptions to the tendency of consensus countries to be less strike-prone than majoritarian democracies" (269). Lastly, Lijphart explores the performance of consensus democracies on budget deficits and economic freedom. Again, the author finds the differences negligible. When using the federated-unitary dimension, Lijphart's finding are similar except when looking at the inflation variable. When comparing consensus democracy on federal-unitary dimension on inflation, Lijphart discovers that a strong negative relationship exists, the relationship is statistically significant, and there is an acceptable t-value. The author explains this relationship by citing that in a consensus democracy the central bank independence. Lijphart writes, "the most important reason why central banks are made strong and independent is to give them the tools to control inflation" (273).
In conclusion, the author writes, "the evidence with regard to economic growth and economic freedom is mixed, but with regard to all of the other indicators of economic performance, the consensus democracies have a slightly better record and a significantly better record as far as inflation is concerned" (270).
The results regarding the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies in controlling political violence are also rather vague. Statistically, the consensus system is slightly violent than the majoritarian system. However, Lijphart contends that the significance of the relationship declines when other variables are controlled and outlying observations are removed. Ultimately, Lijphart contends that the statistics show "at least a slightly better performance of the consensus democracies" (271).
The last group of variables that Lijphart addresses is what he terms the "kinder, gentler" aspects of democracy. The author contends that consensus systems are more apt to be "kinder and gentler" than their majoritarian counterparts. Lijphart writes, "Consensus democracies demonstrate these kinder and gentler qualities in the following ways: they are more likely to be welfare states; they have a better record with regard to the protection of the environment; they put fewer people in prison, and are less likely use the death penalty; and the consensus democracies in the developed world are more generous with their economic assistance to the developing nations" (275-6).
Lijphart measures the effectiveness of consensus intuitions by measuring a number of variables: women's representation, political equality, electoral participation, satisfaction with democracy, government-voter proximity, and accountability and corruption. Statistically, Lijphart's findings when comparing the performance of consensus and majoritarian democracies in regards to the "kinder and gentler" qualities are much more revealing. Lijphart finds that consensus democracy "makes a big difference with regard to almost all of the indicators of democratic quality and with regard to all of the kinder and gentler qualities" (300).
To conclude, Lijphart has found that the institutions of consensus democracies perform slightly better than majoritarian institutions in both macroeconomic management and in the prevention of political violence. However, the differences are slim and arguably irrelevant. But, Lijphart did discover that when looking at the "kinder, gentler" aspects of democracy, such as women's rights, incarceration rates and other, consensus democracy performed substantially better.

Unfortunately not everything gets better with time. The original 1984 version of this book was stellar. An excellent introduction to comparative politics. Easily accessible to undergraduates and a useful reference for early graduates. Unfortunately the new book adds nothing to the original insights and uses surprisingly poor statistical methodology to force points when the data are simply not supportive. At times the author even admits to "arbitrarily selecting thresholds." As a result of the alarmingly poor methodology employed I can no longer use this text as a key componant of my undergraduate comparative politics courses. For graduates I would use it only as an example of what not to do.

"...and it's no secret that Stalin starved his people." maybe it's no secret. neither is it a secret that mao murdered millions of innocent chinese. but it is very un-pc to acknowledge such things, because it leads into dangerous un-pc areas the progressive thought police want to keep you away from. Students might get the wrong ideas about unimportant things such as communism and communist aggression, mccarthyism, nationalism, american sovereignty, private property, freedom and gun ownership; things which really aren't issues in today's world in which we are all citizens of the global village.

I am a history lover and always want to hear the truth. A lot was left out of my history classes when I was a kid. I am glad to see a book like this on the market. It is past time to get the truth out to the children of today instead of the watered down information that is out there now.

Our perception of history shapes our view of politics and economics. So, it should come as no surprise that US history textbooks of the past hundred years have portrayed the strong national government as a laudable development in the evolution of modern politics.

Professor Woods casts a critical eye upon the state sanctioned history as told by leftist/rightist historians and focuses on the simple truth.

The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History is informative, well written, and academically rigorous.

My one criticism of the book is its length. The publisher set an 80-thousand word limit for Dr. Woods, and since his writing style is such a joy to read, one is left wanting more...much more.

But fear not, one of the greatest contributions of this work is Professor Woods' 10-page bibliography filled with reference works and resources that will help you continue your studies.

Some of the highlights of 'The Politically Incorrect Guide to American History' include:

1. The origins of religious freedom in the colonies
2. The founding fathers weren't the Godless radicals of the french revolution...in fact, they were conservatives, seeking to preserve ancient rights
3. The states ratified the constitution with the understanding that they could leave the compact at will.
4. The Tenth Amendment - Cornerstone of the Constitution
5. The roots of big government - the "general welfare clause" was NOT a clause at all.
6. What was the difference between the Republicans and the Federalists?
7. Did Lincoln fight to "save the union?" or "free the slaves?"
8. Why big business is good
9. What did Wilson do that got us into WWI? Why did he want war?
10. The truth about the Great Depression and the New Deal...Roosevelt was NOT a student of economics.
11. FDR, an imperial president that lied to get us into war.
12. Commies in the government? You mean McCarthy was actually RIGHT?..."at long last sir, have you no decency?"
13. Who was the real JFK?
14. Why LBJ and the "great society" wer both miserable failures.
15. The '80's...charitable giving during the "decade of greed"
16. Why Michael Milken was the good guy.
17. Budget cuts were a myth
18. "The era of big government is over"...Yeah, whatever!

This is a rousing read. Historical truth is infinitely more fascinating than the propaganda of mainstream history textbooks currently treated by the academy as "textus receptus."

If you are a would-be student of American history, you should pick up a copy of this book. It will let you put your 'foot in the water' so to speak, and start you down a path of joyous discovery. Well, let me amend that slightly...not all the discoveries I've made have been joyous. But the unvarnished truth is better to be had than the lies that cost the lives of millions.

Very readable book that raises a lot of points you won't find in a conventional American history book. Most thought-provoking was the discussion of whether Lincoln legally should have let the southern states secede. Should be required reading for voters.

I really enjoy history and my home proves that well. This book is simple and truthful and I'm so glad that it has been written. I only wish it went into more depth.

Although somewhat dry, this is a great book that delineates the world's hotspots and America's role in it. It does a good job summarizing the modern history of these regions and the relationships which the US must engage in order to maintain it's global leadership.

As recently reported, the author of this book Brzezinski has wholeheartedly endorsed Barack Obama for President for 2008, and was one of the first well known foreign policy experts to do so. Brezezinski has been chosen by Obama as his key foreign policy advisor. Barack Obama has also been very forthright in his praise of Brzezinski as "someone I have learned an immense amount from", and "one of our most outstanding scholars and thinkers".

Brezeinski's daughter is a regular TV host on various MSNBC news talk shows.

Zbigniew Brzezinski's "The Grand Chessboard" is a geopolitical strategy for U S perpetual imperialism. Although he served as Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbig knows nothing of a U S Constitution. He favors imperialism and all its vulgar mafia-driven tenets; racism, mass murder, and plunder. As explained in Don't Weep for Me, America: How Democracy in America Became the Prince (While We Slept) Zbig contributed to the Neo-Con movement to re-map the Middle East by writing in "The Grand Chessboard" in 1997, "...as America becomes an increasingly multicultural society, it may find it more difficult to fashion a consensus on foreign policy issues, EXCEPT IN THE CIRCUMSANCES, OF A TRULY MASSIVE AND WIDELY PERCEIVED DIRECT EXTERNAL THREAT". His signal was picked up by the Neo-cons and on September 11, 2001, New York was the chosen target of A TRULY MASSIVE AND WIDELY PERCEIVED DIRECT EXTERNAL THREAT. Funny how these things happen...

Basically, this book is the work of a mastermind geostrategist that outlines his view of America's global role, and what we need to do to maintain our global preeminence. The book is dated-it was published in 1997-but in a way this makes it interesting as we can see how some of Brzezinski's predictions have come to fruition.

First things first, Brzezinski is not some kind of devious Dr. Evil, and he has been highly critical of American actions under the current administration, so to say that he is some sort of pre-cursor to the Bush doctrine is unfair and inaccurate. Obviously, any book that refers to the potential fate of whole countries as a grand game of chess is certain to ruffle feathers, but this is basically what international relations experts do. This is a practical, unsentimental, and insightful argument for American global primacy and how we should use our power and influence for good. This is not to say that I agree with this worldview, I don't, but there's no need to get hysterical about it.

Brzezinski mostly concentrates on Eurasia, which according to him is the central battleground for competing global powers. Not only does it have plentiful natural resources, but its geographic location-the meeting point between Europe and Asia-essentially make it the center of the advanced world. Brzezinski fluently describes the potential problem spots in this area as well as potential rivals, allies and global aspirants. France, Germany, Russia, China, and to a lesser extent Turkey and Iran are all important world players in this chess game and for what it's worth, Brzezinski favors friendly relations with all of these countries. Unlike our current leaders, he opposes the demonization of any country and insists that all the aforementioned powers can be brought into a mutually beneficial relationship.

To be fair, Brzezinski argues that a sudden end to American supremacy would likely be disastrous to the region, causing massive instability and anarchy. He also claims that if we abandon our imperial role, this will only leave the door open for another, perhaps less benevolent power to take our place. He also claims that America's hegemony is best understood as a temporary substitute for a more equal global partnership. Of course this is all debatable, and it is fair to argue that imperialism is the cause of this region's problems, but Brzezinski sees the world as it is, not as it should be.

So whether you see Brzezinski as a benevolent visionary, or a maniacal plotter of world domination, this book is an excellent glimpse into the mind of a brilliant globalist and international strategist. Highly recommended to anyone with the slightest interest in international affairs.

Everyone should read this book.

In the late 90's Brzenzinski gave his plan for how the US should dominate the world.

Bush has followed it to a T.

Interesting - Democrats plan - Republicans execution.

Fantastic that all the news sources have pretty much given it a pass.

B explains that to get the US people to attack middle asia - which he feels we must - it will take a Perl Harbor class event.

He also explains why it is necessary to dislodge governments friendly to Russia from the countries near russia.

Read it and think

Linda Robinson's "Tell Me How This Ends: General Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq" is a superb addition to the next wave of Iraq War literature: the Surge Assessments. Hitting the ground before new books by Gordon, Ricks, Woodward, et al., Robinson of the "US News and World Report" tells more than the tale of how a General and his wizards turned around a failed military effort. "Tell Me How This Ends" is a holistic picture of the Surge. It takes the reader from fractious discussions in the White House --- where a beleaguered President pushed aside all of his senior military advisors to go the extra mile for success --- down to the burning fighting vehicles of the troops who bought battlefield progress with their blood. Robinson's battle stories of the 5th Cavalry, 26th Infantry, 23d Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, and the Marines in Anbar will quiet those who think we can't take a punch or fight this kind of war.

At the same time, Robinson knows her counterinsurgency theory. She portrays the struggle for Iraq as essentially a political contest and spends many pages discussing how Ambassador Ryan Crocker and his team prodded the Maliki government to act in the whole nation's interest. Among the more interesting pages are those on the Awakening, the process whereby Sunni tribesmen were turned against the vicious, foreign influences of Al Qaeda. Equally interesting were the chapters on how the central (Shiite-dominated) Iraqi government is dealing with those armed Sunnis, who are, at least for now, nominally on their side. Another highlight --- at least for this old soldier-bureaucrat --- was the inner workings of Team Petraeus and how this remarkable General adapted a standard military bureaucracy to the task of politico-military innovation. The cooperation documented here between the Embassy and the Command was also exemplary.

All of these issues are covered with great insight, fueled by experienced, on-the-ground reporting. There is a minimum of anonymous, third-hand sources in this book. Most of the participants speak clearly here in their own words, or through first hand observations, or by their subsequent actions. If good journalism is the first draft of history, we can be well satisfied with Robinson's contribution. The title passage --- tell me how this ends --- was actually a rhetorical question from then-Major General Petraeus at the start of the Iraq war. In a twist of historical irony, the questioner became responsible for crafting the political-military answer to his own question. Much progress has been made, but as Petraeus himself has recently noted, we are not yet ready for dancing in the end zone. This is the critical set of issues covered holistically by Linda Robinson in this well-reported and highly readable book. She has set the bar high for those who come after her.

This review represents my personal views and does not represent the policy or opinion of any U.S. government entity.

Joseph J. Collins, National War College, August 25, 2008.