Politics Government Books

I had to read this book for a graduate class and I found it very helpful and informative as a human rights "beginner." It is not so dense that it is difficult to read but it's also not a watered-down text.

In a sense, this book is so good it doesn't need a review. Almost everyone knows that the Donnelly book is the standard and most readable text on human rights theory. It is a good starter book for the beginner. You'll learn something new on every page. My copy is full of irresistable, self-made underlines, markings, and comments in the margins. It's also a good reference book, one that you'll return to time and time again. Donnelly's method of abbreviation, for example, is standard for the main UN proclamation and two binding covenants (treaties): (U for UDHR; E for CESCR; and C for CCPR). The book differentiates between regimes that exist for declaratory or promotional purposes and those which are involved in implementation of policy or monitoring and enforcement, and Donnelly pulls no punches when pointing out that some state reports in response to Protocol complaints are nothing more than farces. It is found, for example, that there is little reason why the Arab League and various Third Way movements should even be considered human rights organizations. Here are some of the international human rights discussed in this book: Nondiscrimination, Life, Liberty, security of person, Protection against slavery,Protection against torture, Legal personality, Equal protection of the law, Legal remedy, Protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, Access to independent and impartial tribunal, Presumption of innocence, Protection against ex post facto law, Privacy, Freedom of Movement, Nationality, Marry and found a family, Protection and assistance of families, Marriage only with free consent, Equal rights in marriage, Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, Freedom of opinion and expression, Freedom of assembly, Freedom of association, Participation in government, Social security, Work, Just and favorable conditions of work, Trade unions, Rest and leisure, Adequate standard of living, Education, Participation in cultural life, Self-determination, Protection of and assistance to children, Freedom from hunger, Health, Asylum, Property, Compulsory primary education, Humane treatment when deprived of liberty, Protection against imprisonment for debt, Expulsion of aliens only by law, Prohibition of war propaganda, Minority culture.

this is a good book that sums up what nader is about and who he is fighting for, the american consumer. it is a collection of his many writings throughout numerous decades. good way to get acquainted with him.

Ralph Nader's life and activity have been devoted to fighting for the underdog in America against a greedy corporate elite and an increasingly corrupt deceitful political establishment in its service that does no longer represent the best interests of the citizenry whether with regard to the environment, guaranteed health care, education, equal rights before the law, fair pay, pension protection etc..

Ralph is a talented, decent and highly inspiring American public figure who deserves to be entrusted with the power to serve the legitimate interests of the majority of the American people.

I haven't even finished the book yet and I still came on the computer for the sole purpose of writing this review. Ralph Nader's book directly informed and educated me on corporate welfare and abuse and much much more. I feel empowered from reading it and I now know who I would vote for in a future election. When I got into an argument with an ignorant co-worker about the accomplishments of Nader, I told him about Ralph's efforts to make cars, water, and air safer, his battle against corporate abuses, and his various organizations. My co-worker still unfairly chastised him, with unsubstantiated claims. My hands were literally shaking with fury that anyone could deny the work of this hero for the citizens, taxpayers, workers, stockholders and consumers- THE PEOPLE.

Ralph Nader is an amazing person, a brilliantly spoken and well argued defender of democracy, in the truest sense. This collection of writings, spanning much of his public career is a testament to his dedication. As Barbara Eherenreich states in the preface, "he's gotten more radical over the years, not less." His concern for fairness and freedom has taken him into many areas of confrontation with the corporate and ruling elite. He obviously had the most distinguished public record of all candidates in the last presidential election. But even if we the people don't give him the respect he deserves with our votes, he will continue to work for us, because his work is not to gain power, but to give us back our power. This collection of essays is of vital importance. Use it to enlighten yourself and perhaps you will find yourself as driven as Citizen Nader to help restore democracy. (Also, Steve Andersen's review for Amazon is very well put.) If you haven't read or listened to Ralph Nader, you are only hurting yourself.

This book stinks! Hey Ralph, wake up, the 60's are over, this is the twentieth century!! If you really cared about The People, you would return any money they paid for this ridiculous book.

Generally, we trust textbooks to provide us with facts. This one provides us instead with opinions that are based on faulty facts. I can certainly understand trying to defend more conservative ideologies in another forum, but slipping this nonsense into classrooms to indoctrinate unsuspecting students with lies and prejudice is completely indefensible. Buying this book means that you are a bad person.

The latest edition's chapter on "Environmental Policy" contains a discussion of global warming so biased and misleading it would humble a tobacco industry PR man:

* "It is a foolish politician who today opposes environmentalism. And that creates a problem, because not all environmental issues are equally deserving of support. Take the case of global warming." (p. 559)

* "The earth has become warmer, but is this mostly the result of natural climate changes, or is it heavily influenced by humans putting greenhouse gases into the air?" (p.559)

* "On the one hand, a warmer globe will cause sea levels to rise, threatening coastal communities; on the other hand, greater warmth will make it easier and cheaper to grow crops and avoid high heating bills." (p. 559)

* "But many other problems are much less clear-cut. Science doesn't know how bad the green-house effect is." (p. 566)

These are not quotes from oil company press releases. These and other such statements are made by the authors of American Government in the same omnipotent, textbook tone with which we are all familiar.

Two of the world's most respected climate scientists, Dr. James Hansen and Dr. Michael MacCracken, have weighed in with Houghton Mifflin to denounce the book and demand revisions. "I find it alarming that a widely-used textbook from a respected publisher would contain so many gross errors," wrote Hansen. "Failure to correct the book's errors will leave students gravely misinformed about the facts and science of global warming, one of the most serious problems that we as a society and a species face."

I never thought I'd be interested in gov't until I read this. It tells what the founders were thinking when they instituted this gov't we have and what their intentions were when they wrote the constitution. I thought that the gov't was here for the fat cats to sit on their butts and live off us all, but when I learned that the ppl that wrote everything had the interests of the gen. pop. in mind I thought that was pretty darn cool!

This textbook has generated a firestorm of controversy. Here are some direct quotations from the text.

"The Supreme Court has ruled that children cannot pray in public schools . . . " (p. 86)

"Students pray in front of a high school in Virginia. The Supreme Court will not let this happen inside a public school." (caption beneath a photograph, p. 111)

"Since 1947 the Court has applied the wall-of-separation theory to strike down as unconstitutional every effort to have any form of prayer in public schools . . ." (p. 112)

". . . long after the Supreme Court had decided that praying and Bible reading could not take place in public schools . . ." (p. 460)

These statements are false. State-sponsored prayer is what is prohibited. It would have been a simple matter for the authors to have written that. What they chose to do instead is promote the canard that the Supreme Court is prohibiting children from praying in school. The Supreme Court has never said any such a thing.

This is all the worse because John DiIulio is the former head of George Bush's "Faith-based Initiative," and a well-known proponent of what he calls a balanced approach to religion in the public sphere. He has every right to promote his view, no less because I disagree with him. He has no right to mis-state the facts to support it, especially in a student textbook.

The text's main discussion on school prayer is found at pp. 110-113. It begins with the standard know-nothing bromide that the First Amendment does not "clearly require the 'separation of church and state.'" That may be the authors' opinion. Our Supreme Court has consistently held otherwise.

These pages amount to an indictment of our Constitutional framework. The authors complain that the drafters of the First Amendment could have adopted other language from earlier drafts, which read "no religion shall be established by law" and "no national religion shall be established." Yes, they could have, but they didn't, and that is the point. The authors focus exclusively on the clarity of these earlier drafts, completely ignoring the fact that their rejection clearly shows that for the drafters clarity was not the only issue. Obviously, they intended something broader, namely, the wall of separation that these authors obviously do not believe in and do not like.

I think the men who drafted the First Amendment got it right, and so have our courts. I think government has no business meddling in religion, or peddling it. I think religion thrives precisely because the government stays out of it.

However, what I think is not the point. Regardless what I believe or the authors believe, a student textbook is not an appropriate place for them to peddle their politics, especially by writing things that simply are not true.

This is appropriately a scandal. Authors with a political slant tried to use a textbook to indoctrinate, not educate, and not just on this issue - and they got caught. It is a pity because when they are not writing about controversial subjects, they write a good book.

These authors, the publisher and College Board should be ashamed of themselves for letting this happen. These and other inaccuracies are inexcusable, and should be corrected without further delay.

The book contains multiple factual errors and examples of bias, especially in sections about supreme court decisions and environmental issues. Do your students a favor and choose a better book.

This book deals with a central question. Why do leading states after major wars institutionalize and even strategically restrain their powers? Ikenberry's response is that 'states in this situation have sought hold onto power and make it last, and that this has led these states, paradoxically, to find ways to set limits on their power and make it acceptable to other states".(p. xi) To analyze this central puzzle, the author looks at the settlements of 1815, 1919, and 1945 as well as the end of the cold war. These times are important turning points in the history of world politics as major powers search for a new international order.

Moreover, this book has important implications for contemporary American foreign policy makers. "The United States has entered the new century as the world's lone superpower. Whether that extraordinary power can be put to good use in creating a lasting and legitimate international order will in no small measure determined by how American officials use and operate within international institutions. It might appear that there are few constraints or penalties for the United States to exercise its power unilaterally and at its own discretion. But the theory and historical experiences in these chapters suggest otherwise. The most enduringly powerful states are those that work with and through institutions". (p.20)

Overall, After Victory is a very good contribution to diplomatic history, international relations theory as well as to American foreign policy.

John Lewis Gaddis is probably the foremost historian of the Cold War.

Strategies of Containment provides a complete basic overview of the subject of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. It is specifically a history of the U.S.'s containment policy toward the Soviet Union and the Communist-bloc and its evolution over time.

It begins with U.S. diplomat George Kennan's famous memomorandum or "long telegram" from the Soviet Union which provided the guide for interpreting the intentions of the Soviet that was used by the State Department and the Executive Branch in formulating U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union and the Communist-bloc nations - especially during the early stages of the Cold War. If a U.S. foreign service officer or other U.S. official wanted to understand the Soviet Union's foreign policy or history and the considerations which would impact the Soviet leadership's behavior - he or she was directed to read it.

The initial assessment by Kennan and his subsequent use of the term "containment" in a Foreign Affairs magazine for the first time, was controversial and volumes have been written on what he meant.

His approach basically was to advise against a wholesale reordering of the world order based on U.S. values which would cause consternation in the Soviet leadership and trigger Soviet defensive diplomatic (and potentially more drastic measures) in opposing the new international framework.

Kennan wanted diversity in the international system, to allow the Soviet Union to participate within it, and not undermine or be alienated from it, and thus transformed by it over time. The history of the Soviet Union's participation in the UN and its institutions confirms his analysis.

Kennan initially argued for a particularist approach as opposed to a universalist approach. He also argued for strong point as opposed to wide-scale perimeter opposition to expanding Soviet spheres of influence.

Kennan's writings set the stage for an interpretation of Soviet behavior and intentions. He studied Soviet and Russian history and knew that the Soviet Union would seek to build buffer zones between it and any potential adversary. The Napolean invasion, Germany's invasion, etc. as well as the Crimean War, and the Russo-Japanes War of 1905, and the U.S. and European intervention in the Russian civil war, all shaped the Soviet leadership's thinking.

Kennan wanted to restore a balance of power at the interface between the East and West in the European theater as well as in Asia, but without contesting every Soviet move for influence along its borders and without alienating the Soviet Union from the new international order.

Truman subsequently instituted a policy review process that led to NSC-68 which expressly stated that the U.S. policy was to promote U.S. values of freedom and human dignity. Containment then moved into the shape of a perimeter-type defensive strategy in which Soviet moves on its periphery for political and military influence was to be contested.

The book then describes U.S. national security policy and how U.S. containment evolved over time into Eisenhower's "New Look" policy in which no further Soviet expansion of its power into other nations was to be uncontested and then later into "flexible response" under Kennedy and Johnson and then detente under Kissinger.

The book is an excellent introduction to the Cold War, the U.S. policy of containment and its evolution.

This book show us the strategies of Containment in the Cold War Era; an important beginning had been made with the Truman Doctrine and the Containment thesis, which established a defensive position holding back Soviet expansionism.
In 1947 the US had an exclusive monopoly on the ultimate weapon, the atomic weapon, and this monopoly should be used -the bomb "makes politically possible....the domination of the world by a single sufficiently large state". The architect of containment was George Frost Kennan, best known as "the father of containment" and as a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War.
He later wrote standard histories of the relations between Russia and the Western powers. The NSC-68, the most important of all Cold War documents, was "a plan of military rearment and development is at present going forward". It's the central document of the Cold War that transformed containment into a global crusade. Approved by Harry Truman in April 1950, it still lacked Congressional funding and support, and Truman was too weak a president to push it throught in the absence of a major crisis.
It would have been interesting if the author of the book had also used an approach from the Soviet point of view, as well as one in the West and the United States. In addition, Henry Kissinger has been widely studied and detailed, but it seems that is not mentioned in the book the figure of the first Secretary of State of the Nixon presidency, William Rodgers.

Now in a revised edition, Strategies Of Containment: A Critical Appraisal Of American National Security Policy During The Cold War is a revised and expanded edition of Bancroft Prize winner and Cold War expert John Lewis Gaddis' classic on understanding the history of containment as a policy, its role in bringing the Cold War to an end, and its possible value or pitfalls in the future. Originally published during the Regan presidency when the Soviet Union was still a superpower, Strategies Of Containment includes a greatly expanded chapter on Reagan, Gorbachev, and the completion of containment, as well as a new epilogue. A welcome scrutiny of history with the advantage of post-Cold War hindsight.

This book is still useful even 20 years after publication. Gaddis view US policy toward the USSR as a pendulum that swings between"symmetrical" and "asymmetrical" approaches. The periods are split into: Kennan's original containment, NSC-68, Eisenhower's "New Look", JFK and Nixon's détente. There is a coda covering Carter, but it is less helpful.

The symmetrical approach confronts the USSR wherever the USSR chooses to probe. In this approach, wherever the Soviets seek to advance is, by their very actions, a US interest. In contrast, the asymmetrical view seeks to identify those areas that are inherently vital US interests and protect those.

The first seeks to build a fence (containment) around the Soviets. The second approach builds its fences around US interests and lets the USSR do what it wants - within reason - elsewhere. Heck, why let them do that? The answer is "means." Gaddis stresses the point that US means are not unlimited. The US must balance means and ends and this leads to the pendulum swings.

The reasons I do not give the book the last star are: It does not cover the Carter-Reagan-Bush era and Smith over draws the magnitude of the swings. The book makes it sound like there were tremendous differences between the various administrations and does not pay enough attention to the essential consistency of US Cold War strategy. Smith acknowledges this in a retrospective on his own book available at the Hoover Institute web site.

Strategies of Containment, by John Lewis Gaddis, is a description of the evolving strategy of containment that was the basis of US policy toward the Soviet Union from 1946 through 1989. Gaddis traces the concept of containment from its inception by George F. Kennan through the modifications applied by five administrations and assesses the strengths, weaknesses, and effectiveness of each version. This book is more than another chronology of the cold war; it provides deep insights into strategic thinking and is essential reading for any serious student of the cold war. Here's a brief summary:

Kennan's Original Doctrine of Containment

* Identify and defend vital interests based on the centers of industrial strength - Britain, Western Europe, Japan -don't try to defend the entire world.
* Use all instruments of power: economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural power as well as military power. Rebuilding the economic vitality of the above areas is a high priority.
* Seek to divide the communist world. Our primary adversary is the Soviet Union. Other communist countries, if not actively supporting Soviet policy, may be led to serve as quasi-allies by depriving the Soviets of their support.
* General war with the Soviets is unlikely, so we can afford to take risks. We can limit our defense spending and not try to defend the world. A point defense of our vital interests is probably adequate.
* Define threats in light of US vital interests, not in terms of Soviet capabilities

Truman and NSC-68

* The policies articulated in NSC-68 moved toward a perimeter defense covering the entire world rather than a point defense of vital interests.
* Primary emphasis was switched to military power and to the entire spectrum of war
* US interests were redefined in response to perceived threats (anything that is threatened must be an interest).
* US strategy became based on a symmetric response to threats - responding in the same time, place, and with the same means as the adversary (e.g., the Korean War).

Eisenhower, Dulles, and the New Look

* Eisenhower's guiding philosophy was that defense is not just defeating the enemy - it is the preservation of our economic and political systems.
* Spending too much on defense could destroy these systems by leading to either inflation or the imposition of autocratic controls. He reduced the defense budget by 33% from Truman's last year and held it at about that level for eight years.
* Alliances relied on allies for ground forces with the US providing Air and Naval support.
* The nuclear threat became the cornerstone of deterrence across the spectrum of conflict - with goal of avoiding war - in belief that any war was all too likely to escalate to nuclear.
* Asymmetric response to threats - response need not be in same place or using same methods as Soviet threat
* Anti-colonial Conundrum: The communists are fomenting wars of national liberation while the US is trying to rebuild Europe (the colonial powers). If the US backs decolonization, it undermines the European allies it is trying to rebuild. If the US backs the colonial powers, it loses any chance of support from the colonies. The Soviets really put us in a no-win position on this issue.

Kennedy, Johnson, and Flexible Response

* Kennedy and Johnson return to NSC-68 reasoning by lowering threat of nuclear response and replaced it with flexible response, requiring a direct, symmetric response to threats - a respond in same time and place using the same means.
* These administrations applied a circular logic: Threats create interests which demand responses which require capabilities even where no interest previously had been identified. This was articulated in the "bear any burden, pay any price" rhetoric.
* This strategy necessitated greater reliance on military response versus economic, political, etc which increased demands on the defense budget.
* Kennedy abandoned Eisenhower's commitment to a balanced budget and relied on Keynesian fiscal policy to stimulate the economy. Spending was predicated on the potential of the economy rather than its actual performance. Lack of budgetary constraints led to inability to prioritize, to distinguish the essential from the peripheral, the feasible from the infeasible which encouraged more "bear any burden, pay and price' reasoning because it wasn't real money.
* Flexible response led to graduated escalation in Viet Nam which became "never enough to defeat the enemy, just enough to prolong the war". Stakes were repeatedly raised to prevent the humiliation of a defeat but this only made the eventual defeat more humiliating.
* Calibrated escalation yielded the initiative to the enemy - allowed him to define the terms of conflict. Deterrence can be made effective only if the adversary can be made to doubt that he can retain control of the situation. Taking the nuclear option away encouraged adversaries to call our bluff.

Nixon, Kissinger and Détente

* Nixon and Kissinger moved the US government from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world view by positing the existence of five significant power centers: US, USSR, Western Europe, China, and Japan. They recognized that these five power centers were far from equal. Only the US and USSR were superpowers able to exert substantial influence via military, economic, political, or diplomatic means. This strategy was a return to the balance of power envisioned by Kennan.
* In the military arena, they focused on sufficiency rather than superiority over the Soviet Union and sought to persuade Brezhnev that a similar policy would be in his country's best interest as well. Sufficiency won the logical argument over superiority because the latter invariably provoked the other side into matching every military advance, producing and endless and unwinnable arms race.
* Conceptually, Kissinger and Nixon changed the country's strategic definition of US interests and threats to those interests. For most of the interval between Kennan and Nixon-Kissinger, the US strategic view had started with the USSR, its capabilities and intentions, then identified the impact these capabilities could have. These impacts became viewed as threats and US interests were defined as anything thus threatened. Nixon and Kissinger reversed the logical flow, much as Kennan did, starting with the identification of US interests, independent of any adversary. They then identified as an adversary an entity with capability and intent to harm these interests.
* Again returning to Kennan's approach, Nixon-Kissinger sought to use negotiations to influence Soviet behavior. They took a long-term approach to negotiations, discarding the tendency of previous administrations from Roosevelt on to use negotiations and agreements with the Soviets for domestic political purposes. They discarded the approach of seeking agreements on specific areas where they could be reached and adopted a strategy of linkage - maintaining that Soviet unwillingness to negotiate in good faith on military and strategic issues of importance to the US would result in US refusal to accommodate Soviet desires for economic and trade relations and recognition of the post war division of Europe.
* The next step in the Nixon-Kissinger strategy was to seek an accommodation with China to reduce US-Chinese tensions and, thereby, free China to take a more assertive stance in its own dealings with the USSR. This was a return to Kennan's goal of dividing communism and redefined our prime enemy as the Soviet Union

Reagan

Reagan continued the return to Kennan's original concept of containment:
* Adopt an asymmetric strategy - don't let the enemy determine the time, place, and terms of conflict
* Apply economic, political, diplomatic, and moral power more than military power. A prime example was his Berlin speech: "Mr. Gorbachev! Tear down this wall!" He put the Soviets in the same kind of no-win position that they had inflicted on Eisenhower over colonialism in the 1950s by setting the Eastern Europeans at odds with the Kremlin.
* He recognized that Soviet system was bankrupt financially, intellectually, morally and turned up the pressure until it collapsed.
* Reagan was also lucky. Kennan had hoped to transform the Soviet Union with the help of a new generation of Russian leaders. Gorbachev turned out to be the leader Kennan had hoped for. He and Reagan together ended the cold war and transformed the Soviet Union from a totalitarian system to one that might have evolved into a more liberal one had the 1991 coup d'état not destroyed it first.

This is a great book on all the modern Presidents from FDR to George Walker Bush. It is organized by chapters on each President, and addresses subthemes such as the President's cognitive style, emotional intelligence, etc. It contains a lot of great anecdotal evidence, and offers great insight on the evolution of the Presidential Office, and how different factors (both intrinsic and extrinsic to the President) affect success and failure.

Some parts of the book felt inflated - like the author really didn't have much to say about the topic, but felt he had to write something anyway. Also, I don't agree with his assessments with some Presidents, namely JFK, but all in all I would recommend this book for its very straightforward diction, and informative content.

Greenstein's The Presidential Difference is short and sweet. It condenses the story of our Presidents from FDR to George W. Bush into an easy to read manner. Each chapter is dedicated to a President and gives six points upon which they are evaluated, which makes comparisons with other Presidents in the book easy. Even with only 223 pages nothing seems to be left out. The book is engaging from beginning to end and before you know it you have gone through twelve presidencies. To end it all Greenstein wraps 13 chapters up in a magnificent conclusion titled "Lessons from the Modern Presidency". There isn't any more one can ask for. I highly recommend this book as a good read, that is fun, short, and a great way to brush up on knowledge of our Presidents.

Greenstein does a great job in setting aside his bias and reporting on the facts from the people who knew. He reports on the "Modern Presidency" - all of the presidents who were elected from FDR to Clinton. He evaluates them based on a number of qualities including vision, cognitive ability and a few other qualities. Greenstein first gives a basic history of life before being elected president and then evaluates the qualities. At the end of the book, he sums up the qualities he has just evaluated and proceeds to explain that no president will ever be able to perfect all of these qualities because every man is flawed. Overall, this is a great read for everyone who wants to brush up on their knowledge of these presidents. It doesn't go into too much detail but what it does present is both useful and sufficient.

Fred Greenstein explores the leadership style of the presidents from FDR to Bill Clinton in his piece "The Presidential Difference." In the new edition, Greenstein includes an updated afterword on George W. Bush. The book is a great introduction to the modern day presidents and is recommended to the amateur historian to the most serious public policy students.

The organization of the book is wonderful. Greenstein spends a chapter on each president. The format is the same for each chapter. Each opens with interesting quotes from the respective president, and then goes into a brief biography. Greenstein then spends time describing the major events of the president's tenure, and closes the chapter with the significance of the president's leadership. In doing this last bit, Greenstein analyzes five areas of each chief: public communication, organizational capacity, political skill, cognitive style, and emotional intelligence.

There are other aspects of the book that are praiseworthy. Greenstein scatters wonderful pictures throughout; my favorite is of LBJ in the face of Senator Theodore Green. The appendix is also a wonderful tool, as it in effect shows the resume of each president. It outlines important life events and information, election results, the political composition of Congress, appointments, staff, and key events.

This book is recommended to all as a great introduction the the U.S. presidency.

This book by political scientist Fred Greenstein is the first I've read focusing, not on presidential achievement but on effective leadership. Using a series of criteria including vision, cognitive ability, management style and most importantly emotional intelligence, Greenstein looks briefly yet closely at each president from FDR through Clinton with a special afterword on George W. Bush. (pre 9/11) Greenstein chronicles the successes and failings of each president he profiles. Roosevelt receives the highest regards for his ability to translate his popularity into bold leadership. His secretive and manipulative management style is condemmed. Truman is praised for his management style but criticized for his inability at times to lead the nation along the lines of his vision. There is truth to this criticism but Greenstein doesn't look at external facotrs that effected Truman's ability to govern such as the Republican demagoguery of the Democrats as "soft on communism". Eisenhower is highly praised, and properly so, for his strong management style and his strong, quiet leadership. Kennedy gets deserved criticism for his early failings but not enough credit for his later growth. One thing Kennedy is properly criticized for, in my view, is his overreliance on intellectuals, something that would plague Clinton as well. After Kennedy we have a series of failed presidents, with Ford excepted. The common denominator between Johnson, Nixon and Carter are their weak emotional intelligence quotas. All are thin skinned, unable to work well with others, naturally suspicious of those outside their circle. Clinton too is regarded as weak emotionally. Greenstein's thesis is that persons of low emotional intelligence should not become president as it is a recipe for failure. Interestingly, in his brief comments on President Bush, written before Sept. 11, 2001, he predicts, based on his observations of Bush's steady emotional inner core, that he will be a strong and succesful leader. You don't have to agree with Greenstein's entire analysis to appreciate the achievement of this book. It is refreshing to read a book about the presidency that moves beyond Arthur Schlesinger's tired and outdated theory of active and passive presidents. A good read and I highly recommend it.

I picked up this book primarily from the intriguing cover. The words inside the cover were shocking. This short little book (161 pages of text and 141 pages of notes) is a straightforward account of one of the greatest shames of the century. The extensive research involved gives it the weight of authority. The style of writing was plain reporting and somewhat dry and uninteresting in places. However, I doubt that this book was written to entertain. This work is a must for students of Central American politics and foreign relations. I came away with the growing distrust and dismay of government, including the USA. Patriotism in every land seems to be a diversionary tactic used to orient the populace away from the amoral and often immoral workings of government run by people motivated by greed and fear. I have an equally increasing admiration for the press and good reporting. Free speech and a free press is the conscience, gadfly, and salvation of trusting and sometimes misguided persons.

Mark Danner's short book, The Massacre at El Mozote, is an extremely powerful depiction of not only what can go wrong with US foreign policy, but of the lengths politicians will go through to convince us that what they are doing is, in fact, right. The thoroughness and integrity of Danner's investigation cannot be disputed; on top of that, he is very adept at leaving readers to draw their own conclusions. The book may be the Hiroshima of our times.

While I agree with earlier reviewers, especially the point that what appears to be propaganda should not be immediately dismissed as such, I think the real lesson of the book is that the US, as a leader in world affairs, needs to choose its "friends" very carefully. Danner's book made me realize that while the US likes to shape Latin American policy, in point of fact the powerful "Good Neighbor" to the north is often manipulated by the very regimes it seeks to control. And as citizens of this great country, we have a hard time imagining such a thing.

The butchers of the El Salvador government, trained and financed by the US, knew that they could commit whatever atrocities they wished so long as they opposed the socialist rebels. Consequently, in December 1981, they murdered 767 people at El Mozote and in surrounding villages with impunity because they understood that the political stakes were much higher in Washington once the Reagan administration had committed itself to supporting the status quo. In its frantic attempts to dispute or to ignore the details of the massacre, the Reagan administration-which liked to portray itself as hard-line-really appears as the spineless weakling in this whole affair. Truly, the "tail wagged the dog."

This is an important lesson to bear in mind as the US conducts a new war on terrorism (the Communists having been vanquished years ago). Is our country going to find itself supporting human rights abusers once again because our leaders are afraid of political fallout, by appearing to be weak on combating terrorism or inept at finding WMDs? Human rights--and especially the right to life itself--should be the criteria our government considers when it decides to throw its support behind a foreign government.

I read this book for a college course I am taking that focuses on the struggle between colonizing nations and those nations that are colonized. Looking through this perspective, Danner writes a meaningful account of the massacre at El Mozote, El Salvador that captures enough emotion but still maintains some distance to avoid a blatant bias (towards the guerillas, namely).

This read is not for the weak stomached, as Danner does go into detail as to how many of the townspeople of El Mozote and the surrounding areas were killed. In order to emphasize the brutality that the government allowed, he does recount the slaughter of babies and young children. However, he does later make up for these descriptions through the dealings with the military and its leaders, the relationships of the US and El Salvador, and globally speaking, a fight (perhaps) between the US and the USSR.

This book is well written and easy to follow. Danner does a good job of getting everything said succinctly and it gives an interesting perspective in the minds of many of those involved with the happenings of El Salvador at the time, mainly major leaders from both the guerilla side and the military side. His interviews with these significant people help Danner depict a scene that goes beyond the scope of this one massacre that happens in the small town of El Mozote. He broadens the scope to include the implications this event would later have on the future.

This is probably one of the best books I've read in a while. I had to read it for a history class at Furman University, but it's one I definitley would have read on my own as well. It tells a heart-wrenching story, but gives the facts as they are. Not necessarily an easy story to hear, but one that I feel everyone should know about. It's fairly easy to read and isn't too history-like (a lot of facts, no emotion, confusing to follow). I recommend this book for anyone willing to learn about Latin America, and especially the part that the US plays in allowing things like this to happen.

I read The Massacre at El Mozote immediately after finishing Mark Bowden's Killing Pablo (I was clearly in the mood, at the time, for books revolving around U.S. military/political affairs in Latin America). I absolutely loved Bowden's book but only liked Danner's. I found the prose in El Mozote to be rather dense and fleshy, especially in the first 30 or so pages of the book. Danner's overuse of comma-offset clauses tends to muddle his sentences. But once he cut to the chase, it was much easier to follow along and really get into the action. Overall, it was an eye-opening read, well researched and presented. I really do think that reading Killing Pablo immediately prior to picking up El Mozote colored my opinion tremendously, since I literally was enthralled by Bowden's fast-paced, detailed, page-turning prose and thus somewhat put off by Danner's paragraphs-long sentences.

Unless John McCain wins in November, it will be too long before we have our next military hero turned president. They used to all be this way, especially following the Civil War---Democrat and Republican.

Not sure about those reviewers who deemed this a hagiogrpahy or the writing "pedestrian"; the book is thorough, balanced and erudite. I commend the late Mr. Ambrose for such a wonderful portrait of one of America's great leaders in the two most important places: the battlefields and the Oval Office. They surely don't make 'em like Ike anymore (Barack H. Obama?).

The book is long but not exhaustingly long, goes through his humble heartland childhood, early military life, wartime commands, presidency and beyond. Ambrose looks deep into Ike with letters and meetings never read or seen before. What more can one ask for, especially for me as a military historian? Even the descriptions of battles in WW2 are dead on.

I also admire Ambrose for dedicating this book "TO THE MEN OF D-DAY." Again, if even a professor alive today could scribe so eloquently, these losers would be more likely to dedicate a book to Malcolm X or some Hollywood leftist who fought for "the rights of the oppressed." No respect for America or the military, but I digress...

Read the book. It's objective, analytical and important. I will pass it on to my friends and family, so they can better understand our world and thus make the correct judgments and decisions down the road.

Some Americans like to forget history. Shame on them. As Peggy Noonan said of Sen. Obama recently:

America is Mr. Obama's problem. He has been tagged as a snooty lefty, as the glamorous, ambivalent candidate from Men's Vogue, the candidate who loves America because of the great progress it has made in terms of racial fairness. Fine, good. But has he ever gotten misty-eyed over . . . the Wright Brothers and what kind of country allowed them to go off on their own and change everything? How about D-Day, or George Washington, or Henry Ford, or the losers and brigands who flocked to Sutter's Mill, who pushed their way west because there was gold in them thar hills? There's gold in that history.

This is a very good biography of one of our greatest generals and our 34th president. It begins with Dwight Eisenhower's upbringing in turn-of-the-century Kansas. Ike attended West Point, but did not see combat in World War I. His commanding officers in the Army during the interwar years saw that he had great talent, and Eisenhower was ultimately given command of the Allied forces in World War II. The sense of confidence and optimism that Ike was able to engender in those he commanded helped make D-Day a success.

After the war, he became president of Columbia University. He was elected president in 1952, and gained an armistice in the Korean War six months after he took office. While he was in the White House, Ike presided over many years of peace and prosperity, maintaining a growing economy while avoiding budget deficits and inflation. He instituted the Interstate Highway System, but did not act as strongly as he could have on civil rights. Ambrose believed that Eisenhower's caution was an asset in foreign policy but was problematic for his domestic policy.

The book relates that after he left the presidency, Eisenhower was hawkish on Vietnam and advised LBJ to be more aggressive in his attempts to win the war.

Ambrose made no secret of the fact that he was an Eisenhower admirer, but managed to cover pretty fairly both the strengths and weaknesses of Ike's service as general and president. Americans should be grateful for Eisenhower's hand in ending the sinister Nazi regime and for keeping America safe and prosperous during a decade, the Fifties, that was far more dangerous than most members of Generations X and Y realize.

This is a great biography on an underrated president, and a very easy read. Ambrose is wonderful in being able to pick out the key incidents and describe the Ike's policies without delving into the everyday details that bog down Robert Caro's biographies. Also, while Ambrose doesn't hide his admiration for Ike, he does reflect critically upon his subject, particularly his slow reaction to civil rights and McCarthy, and his inability to stem the arms race.

Part of Ike's genius was projecting a reassuring calm, while acting to keep all of his options open. For example, he never ruled out using atomic weapons against China in the Korean War or Quemoy Island dispute, but because he kept this option open the Chinese backed down. He was tough, but always left a way out for opponents to back down and save face. Some have wondered whether he truly ranks as a great president because he had no major crisis to face, but I believe Ambrose is right when he says preventing war and managing crises well is perhaps an even greater achievement. I have read many presidential biographies, but have rarely felt that any other president matches the maturity and self-confidence of Ike (George H.W. Bush is another president I think had Ike's maturity in managing the presidency). The difference between Ike in Ambrose's book and the childish pronouncements and discussions of the current Bush administration is startling.

Having said that, I would have been interested in a bit of a longer biography, particularly more details on Ike's use of the CIA in Iran (very relevant today). This has been a very controversial aspect of his presidency and seems somewhat out of character for someone who opposed Israel and Britain during the Suez Canal crisis. Also, we get very little of the cabinet, perhaps because Ike relied on them less than other presidents did - even John Foster Dulles is discussed only where necessary. Ike seems to largely have used his cabinet to give him information, not make decisions. (can you imagine a book about Johnson without a central role for McNamara or Nixon without Kissinger?)

Overall, this is a great book, and will hopeful get more Americans to ponder the presidency and whom we want to sit in the Oval Office.

Stephen Ambrose is certainly among the finest contemporary historians in print. And while he has authored several very good biographies, in my opinion, his best work has been chronicling historic events as opposed to the lives of the participants. His works on the Lewis and Clark expedition and the construction of the transcontinental railroad far surpass any of his biographies. Perhaps this is merely coincidence, though there is certainly a difference in each endeavor.

This particular work is a condensation of an earlier two volume effort. In that respect, it is perfectly adequate and probably more enjoyable than the longer and more detailed work. I can't imagine anything that was not included that I would need to know.

Ambrose is certainly an Eisenhower fan, however this does not prevent him from clearly pointing out many of his mistakes and errors, both in the context of his life as Army general and as President. But, while he points out these instances, and many are quite glaring, he nevertheless, unhesitantly, seems to give him an over all pass.

Leadership is a word used quite often by Ambrose in describing Eisenhower. However, in many instances, it is not leadership, but effective administration that proved to be his strongest suit. His ability to serve effectively as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe was more a reflection of his ability to compromise and placate the many different factions involved than it was an indication of leadership, though leadership was certainly involved.

This differentiation became more stark when Eisenhower became President. Leadership becomes more difficult when the followers aren't required by law and army regulations to comply. As President, Eisenhower many times not only failed to display leadership, he quite clearly abrogated responsibility entirely.

In my opinion, Eisenhower's most lasting legacy was steering the country through some of the most turbulent periods of the Cold War without ever having to resort to military power. This at a time when many, if not most, of his advisors were counseling nuclear attack!

It was in the area of civil rights, however, that Ike was most suspect. I try to be very careful in judging historical personages by current standards. To do so is usually unfair. In this case, however, at a time when very many political and social contemporaries were taking stands, Eisenhower disappeared. A case can be made for finessing the issue during the 1956 Presidential campaign, but his failure to "lead" thereafter can only be a tacit endorsement of segregation. Instead of "leading", Eisenhower tried to compromise and bring the parties together, using the same methods that had worked for him in Europe. This was not "leadership", it was abrogation of responsibility.

Perhaps the most distasteful areas of he book are those that attempt to whitewash Eisenhower's relationship with his Army secretary Kay Sommersby. No intelligent human being can doubt that Eisenhower had a sexual relationship with Sommersby, however Ambrose goes through great pains and historical gymnastics to argue that though Ike was infatuated with Sommersby, had multiple opportunities to pursue her sexually, that she was undoubtedly willing and that all the officers around him were conducting extra marital affairs, Ike was innocent of adultery. One of his most laughable assertions was that he simply didn't have time or opportunity to have sex with Sommersby. Shortly thereafter, he documents a train trip to a Mediterranian resort on which Sommersby and several other "army girlfriends" accompanied the staff. At one point, he cites as proof, the fact that he attempted intercourse, but was "flaccid". Please. Simply acknowledge the fact and move on. I don't think any less of Ike's achievements because he had a girlfriend while at war. Ambrose seems to believe that doing so would somehow diminish him in the eyes of many, when instead it would more likely paint him as more human and subject to the same desires and faults as everyone else. I suspect very few will swallow Ambrose's assertions in this area.

Nevertheless, if you're interested in a comprehensive biography on Eisenhower, this is a very good place to go for it.

Informative and easy to read.
He looks at the subject from many angles and delivers a complete picture of the realities in IKE's world. I personally learned a lot not only about Eisenhower but about WWII, about the times at which he served and about the Cold War. A great book.

Just like read a long long laundry list. Or like read an operation manual written by someone just observed how people do the work but don't really understand.

Recommend: Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA. That book is a much better overview of what's CIA's contribution in cold war years and recent days.

The book was very informative. It sidewise criticizes libs as well as conservatives within the CIA. The text has quite a bit of value for the general reader.

Kessler managed to write a series of books throughout his literary career. It isn't his writing prowess that sells his books though- it is his ability to gather comprehensive information that is otherwise unavailable to the public regarding a very secret agency, and present that material to those with the curiosity about the CIA. Kessler writes much like a classroom notetaker, where organization is sometimes compromised by detail upon detail. But this is not a negative thing at all. There is just so much to tell and he leaves nothing out.

I have read many books on this field and Kessler is always good to go back to and be reminded about the basic construct that is the world's strongest spy agency. Granted, much has changed since the early fifties but Inside the CIA will give the reader the inside scoop of what began 50 years ago. Even more, how exactly the agency is run, who reports to whom, how information flows, how operations are carried out, etc... Enjoy this read. I know I did.

I should have read the published date, some of the material is a little out of date. It's good reading though.

This book has a good introduction to the organizational structure of the CIA (when it was written) but little discussion as to operations, policies, successes, failures, background of personnel and the production of intellegence estimates. Very little analysis of these.